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I. Introduction  
In this paper we analyze the effect of property tax limitations on state and local revenue 
during economic recessions. We argue that the changes to revenue policy precipitated by 
property tax limits cause short-term instability during fiscal crises. Our work continues a string 
of research that argues that fiscal limitations often have unintended secondary and tertiary 
consequences. Instead of cutting the size of government, scholars have shown that public officials 
almost always find ways to circumvent the spirit of most taxing, spending, and deficit limitations 
(Kiewiet and Szakaty 1996, Gerber et al. 2001, Kousser, McCubbins, Moule 2008). For 
example, if a limit only restricts property taxes, a locality might switch to revenues derived from 
charges and fees or sales taxes. Likewise, if a revenue limit only restricts state revenues, a hike in 
property tax collections at the local level might ensue. These evasion techniques, while increasing 
government size, allow public officials to abide by the letter of the law. This paper analyzes the 
tertiary consequences of these actions.  
   Despite these known evasiation tactics, the complaints of politicians regarding the bite of 
voter proscribed revenue limitations are especially shrill during recessions. We consider the 
hypothesis that tax caps lead to greater short-term declines in revenue during recessions than 
would otherwise occur in the absence of these caps. We posit that property tax limits and the 
politics of circumvention that they engender have a tertiary effect, aggravating the effects of 
public economic crises. Specifically, we argue that tax revolt legislation has led state and local 
governments to rely on sources of revenue that are increasingly elastic with respect to changes in 
personal income. These new revenue sources are less stable during recessions than the previous 
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mainstay of state and local government revenue, the property tax. As a result, state and local 
revenues are more pro-cyclical, they grow quickly during economic booms and crash during 
recessions.  
This paper tests the hypothesis that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during 
fiscal crises by analyzing time-series, cross-sectional data for the U.S. States. During the time 
frame analyzed in this paper, all fifty states experienced multiple economic declines. For the 
purposes of our test it is especially useful that the states do not suffer downturns at the same 
time and are not subject to property tax limits at the same time. This wide array of variation 
allows us to estimate the interaction affect between property tax limits and recessions. Our 
results support the hypothesis that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines in state and 
local governments during recessions. This suggests that states would have fewer and more modest 
financial problems during economic downturns if they did not enact tax limitations.  
This paper proceeds in five parts. We start by describing the data used throughout this 
paper. We then review the previous literature with respect to the consequences of property tax 
limits on government revenue streams. We then reinforce two findings in the literature, showing 
that property tax limits lead to increases in income taxes and the assessments of charges and fees. 
In the section that follows, we tie these consequences with what is known about revenue 
stability during fiscal downturns from the public finance literature. In particular, we show that 
state income taxes, charges and fees have a relatively high income-elasticity. Next, we present a 
model of the effect of property tax limits, recessions, and their interaction. In so doing, we 
conclude that property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during recessions. In the final section 
we summarize our conclusions.  
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II. Data  
 We start by describing the data used in all statistical analyses in this paper. Our key 
independent (i.e., treatment) variable is an indicator for the presence of a property tax limit (see 
Table 1). The following rules were used to determine the existence of a property tax limit. First, 
the limit must restrict property taxes for all geographic areas of the state (no local options). 
Second, if the limit does not restrict all taxing entities (e.g., it only limits municipalities but not 
special districts), then constrained taxing entities must collect a majority of the state’s property 
taxes. Third, the limit must be either a revenue limit (pegging increases in total property tax 
revenues to an explicit rule) or it must stipulate both a tax rate limit and cap the growth of 
assessed property values simultaneously. This last rule means that states that have assessment 
limits but not tax rate limits are excluded from consideration. The tax limit indicator is coded as 
one in a fiscal year if a state has an active property tax limit and zero otherwise. It is noteworthy 
that several states have repealed their tax limits over our time series.  
    
4 
 
Table 1 
Statewide Property Tax Limits in the US 
State Years Implemented 
Arizona 1981–Present 
Arkansas 1982–Present 
California 1979–Present 
Colorado 1993–Present 
Florida 1995–Present 
Idaho 1980–1992, 1996–Present 
Indiana 1980–Present 
Kansas 1986–1998 
Kentucky 1980–Present 
Maine 2006–Present 
Massachusetts 1982–Present 
Michigan 1979–Present 
Missouri 1981–Present 
Montana 1987–Present 
Nevada 1984–Present 
New Mexico 1980–Present 
Oklahoma 1997–Present 
Oregon Start–Present 
South Dakota 1997–Present 
Utah Start–1986 
Washington 1974–Present 
West Virginia 1991–Present 
Iowa 1979–Present 
Louisiana 1979–Present 
Wisconsin 2006–Present 
Mississippi 1995–Present 
 
We collected a variety of covariates standard in the state and local finance literature to 
control for other factors that affect revenue collections. Specifically, we generally control for 
three measures of population fluctuation: total population, elderly population (as defined by the 
number of individuals over the age of 65), and school-age population (this group was 
approximated using the age category 5–19). Each of these variables was collected from annual 
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estimates of statewide residents by the Census Bureau. We also control for state political 
characteristics using a set of dummy variables that indicate the existence of unified Republican 
government, unified Democratic government, or divided government (c.f. Alt and Lowry 1994, 
2000). For modeling purposes, divided government is omitted and used as the reference group for 
the two other dummy variables. Finally, we control for state personal income and statewide total 
employment to hold constant changes in the economy. Both of these variables were collected from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Descriptive statistics for these variables and others appear in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 
Summary Statistics: 49 states (Alaska Excluded), 1980–2000 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Percent Income Taxes 16.28 8.20 0 32.88 
Percent Sales Taxes 25.43 8.22 5.16 45.71 
Percent Charges and Fees 30.91 5.41 16.71 53.90 
Percent Property Taxes 20.93 7.61 5.70 50.47 
     
School Age Population (million) 1.12 1.18 0.11 7.65 
Elderly Population (milions) 0.63 0.66 0.04 3.56 
Total Population (millions) 5.12 5.45 0.45 33.50 
Total Employment (millions) 2.72 2.88 0.26 18.50 
Personal Income (millions) 151.3 177.3 11.1 1216.2 
Unified Republican Control 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Unified Democratic Control 0.16 0.36 0 1 
     
General Revenue Growth (Δ LN) 0.03 0.04 –0.16 0.22 
Recession Indicator 0.36 0.48 0 1 
 
Another variable used in some of our analysis is a measure of state recessions. Our data 
here comes from work by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005). These authors produce data that 
measures the number of quarters per calendar year that each of the fifty states should be 
6 
 
classified as being in recession between fiscal years 1980–2001. We use this data to create an 
annual indicator of state recessions. Specifically, we classify a state as being in recession if at 
least three quarters of its fiscal year have a recession probability greater than 0.5.1   
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) estimate state recession probabilities quarterly for each 
of the fifty states from 1980–2001 using the Markov-switching model developed by Hamilton 
(1989). Hamilton's method estimates endogenously the timing of shifts from expansion to 
contraction of the economy. This model estimates when the mean growth rate switches between 
high and low growth regimes.2 This estimation procedure produces recession probabilities, 
ranging from zero to one that represent the probability that a state is in a recession in a given 
quarter. In this paper we rely on a simple cut-off method to identify whether or not a quarter can 
be classified as in a recession. If the recession probability is greater than 0.5 during any given 
quarter, a state is coded as being in recession for that quarter. This cut-off rule is non-
controversial as Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) report that recession probabilities are regularly 
either close to zero or close to one.  
Finally, the dependent variables in all analysis are measures of state and local fiscal 
                                                
1 The cut-off of at least three quarters in recession was chosen through a non-parametric estimate of the 
affect of each additional quarter of recession on general revenues. The results of this estimation showed 
that a state must have three or four quarters of recession to see a statistically significant decline in general 
revenues. The size of the coefficients for three and four quarters were statistically indistinguishable, 
suggesting that a dummy variable specification of this variable is superior to a count variable that assumes 
a linear relationship between revenue outcomes and the numbers of quarters in recession.  
2 The underlying data used to calculate recession probabilities is a state-level coincident index by 
Crone (2002). Crone's widely used index follows the methodology developed by Stock and Watson 
(1989) for the national economy. Crone uses three monthly and one quarterly economic indicator to 
estimate the underlying state of the economy. These indicators are nonagricultural payroll 
employment, unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing, and real wage and salary 
disbursements. This data is preferable to other economic indicators because it displays substantial 
business cycle variability (unlike personal income) and is available on a quarterly basis (unlike gross 
state product) for each state.  
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behavior. We rely on data from the Commerce department’s publication of Annual State and 
Local Government finances. The variables included in our analysis are state and local general 
own-sources revenues, income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, and charges and fees. The exact 
specification of each of these variables will be detailed in the discussions of research design that 
precede all statistical analyses.  
 
III. The Consequences of Property Tax Limits on Government Revenues 
In this section we review previous findings on the secondary consequences of property 
tax limits. Before the tax revolt even ended, newspaper columnists and policy experts 
immediately identified ways in which property tax limitations would change government fiscal 
structure. Since then, empirical tests have confirmed many of these speculations (Danziger and 
Ring 1982; Joyce and Mullins 1991; Mullins and Joyce 1996; Kousser, McCubbins, Moule 
2008). Specifically, property tax limits increase a state’s reliance on charges and fees, sales taxes, 
income taxes, and the use of off-budget activities (Bennet and DiLorenzo 1982, Schwartz 1997, 
Thompson and Green 2004). 
A significant conclusion of the previous literature is that property tax limits lead to 
increases in income and sales taxes. Specifically, Thompson and Green (2004) show that 
Oregon's property tax limit prompted the state to rely more heavily on income taxes. Skidmore 
(1999), using data from all fifty states, show that local government restrictions lead to growth in 
state aid to local governments. This is clearly the case in Massachusetts. Increases in state aid 
occurred immediately after the adoption of their property tax limit, Proposition 2 ½. Though this 
increase was initially sustained by a strong economy, the so-called "Massachusetts Miracle", the 
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state was later forced to raise the flat rate personal income tax to sustain high levels of state aid.  
By contrast, increases in the use of the sales taxes were evident in California. Several 
scholars have argued that localities have been turned into “sales-tax farms”, affecting 
redevelopment, zoning, and eminent domain, favoring car dealerships and significant shopping 
malls over mom–and–pop businesses. This activity even garnered a name, the "fiscalization of 
land use." (Schwartz 1997; Lewis 2001) 
There is also strong evidence that property tax limits increase assessments of charges and 
fees. Charges and fees are assessed in a variety of forms: increases in college tuition, business 
licenses and fees, charges for school lunches, park fees, impact fees, or costs associated with 
public parking. Many property tax bills today are now loaded with "special assessments" in lieu 
of ad valorem property taxes (Kogan and McCubbins 2009). Sometimes, the assessment of 
charges in fees instead of property taxes is a simple case of substitution: water bills that were 
once subsidized by local government property taxes and now paid for in full directly by the user 
in the form of standby charges or sewerage fees (Moule 2010).  
Alternatively, charges and fees can also be a consequence of changes to the structure of 
government. Previous research suggests that property tax limits splinter government revenue 
sources. Instead of classic budgetary procedures where the whole of government spending is 
allocated from general revenue sources, property tax limits led to the creation of special funds and 
devolve finances to newly formed special districts or enterprises.  Bennet and DiLorenzo's 
(1982) early work on this subject posited that property tax limits led to a "massive amount of 
off-budget spending and borrowing". In particular, Bennet and DiLorenzo were concerned with 
the proliferation of "off-budget enterprises", the political entities referred to as authorities, 
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districts, commissions, or agencies. Most recently, Bowler and Donovan (2004) found that 
property tax limits were the cause of special district formation, at least in states that heavily used 
the initiative process. Special districts and the like, given their purpose of service delivery, are 
likely to rely on user–fees instead of traditional taxes. 
To bolster and systemize this evidence, we conduct our own test of whether or not 
property tax limits increase reliance on sales taxes, income taxes, and charges and fees. We rely on 
a differences-in-differences model (c.f. Wooldridge 2006) to estimate the effect of property tax 
limits on the relative usage of each revenue stream. This model allows us to hold constant 
unobserved, time-invariant state-level characteristics that predict state and local revenues. 
Additionally, this model controls for variation of the dependent variable related only to the 
passage of time that is constant across all states. 
Our dependent variables are constructed as the specific revenue stream (charges and fees, 
sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes) as a proportion of general own-source revenues. 
Because the errors across these equations are likely to be correlated, we employ a seemingly 
unrelated regression model (Zellner 1962). This model shows statistically significant negative 
correlation in the error terms between each revenue source, as one would expect in when these 
taxes are substitutes for each other.  
Measuring these variables as a proportion of general revenues relieves some of the 
pernicious autocorrelation that often concerns analysis of fiscal outcomes in differences-in-
differences analysis (Bertrand 2004). As an added precaution, however, we present results for a 
limited subset of data. Specifically, the analysis that follows only includes data for every fifth 
year starting in 1977.  This method is preferable to first differencing, another affective way of 
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removing serial correlation, in this instance because we are able to retain our dependent variable in 
levels, as opposed to changes. Our hypothesis predicts that property tax limits will affect the 
level of reliance on each revenue stream. Using every fifth year of data only slightly attenuates 
the significance of our findings. 
We regress our dependent variables on an indicator for property tax limits as well as an 
array of covariates and state and year fixed effects. Our model is estimated by (1): 
(1)       ititititoit uaY ++++!+= "#$$$ 21  
 
Where: 
 
y = fiscal outcome as a proprtion of general, own–source revenues 
Τ = indicator a property tax limit 
θ = Covariates 
κ =  Year fixed effects 
a = State fixed effects 
 
Table 3 
Affect of Property Tax limits on Revenue Components 
Note: Estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. * signifies that the coefficient is significant at the .1 
confidence level; ** at the .05 level; and *** at the .01 level.  The dependent variables are state and local revenue 
components as a percentage of state and local general own–source revenue. Continous covariates are in millions. 
Years estimated are 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Alaska is excluded. 
The results of our estimation are displayed in Table 3. Each continuous covariate (total 
employment, personal income, and all population variables) is transformed to represent the effect 
Charges and Fees Income Taxes Property Taxes Sales Taxes
Property Tax Limit 0.823 (0.443)* 0.912 (0.425)** -1.666 (0.437)*** -0.094 (0.488)
School Age Population 0.425 (1.960) -0.938 (1.881) -1.574 (1.930) 0.376 (2.158)
Elderly Population 3.439 (3.308) -4.643 (3.174) 7.322 (3.258)** -5.314 (3.642)
Total Population -0.509 (1.109) -0.414 (1.064) 2.448 (1.092)** -0.17 (1.221)
Employment -1.316 (1.348) 1.697 (1.293) -4.925 (1.327)*** 3.792 (1.484)**
Personal Income 0.022 (0.010)** -0.003 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009) -0.034 (0.011)***
Unified Democratic Control 0.637 (0.404) -0.706 (0.388)* -0.0659 (0.398) -0.371 (0.445)
Unified Republic Control -0.185 (0.295) -0.027 (0.283) -0.31 (0.291) 0.682 (0.325)**
Constant 41.34 (1.205)*** 16.14 (1.156)*** 4.159 (1.216)*** 34.98 (1.409)***
Observations 294 294 294 294
R-squared 0.904 0.951 0.946 0.938
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of a million–unit change. As is clear from the table, however, the covariates generally do a poor 
job predicting reliance on each type of revenue stream, with the noticeable exception of the 
property tax.  
As predicted the indicator for the presence of a property tax limit has noticeable effects 
on revenue choices. As intended, the adoption of a property tax limit decreases reliance on 
property taxes as a proportion of general revenues. Specifically, the adoption of a property tax 
limit is associated with approximately a 1.66 percentage point reduction of property taxes 
relative to general own-source revenues.  In contrast, the adoption of a property tax limit is 
associated with increased reliance on both income taxes as well as the assessment of charges and 
fees (while the latter is not significant at conventional levels of confidence).  Cumulatively, there 
is perfect substitution between declines in property taxes and increases in income taxes and 
charges and fees, as the latter increase 1.73 percentage points cumulatively. Finally, contrary to 
the previous literature, we find no statistically significant relationship between property tax 
limits and the sales tax in this model.  
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Figure 1 
Reliance on Revenue Sources, Before and After Property Tax Implementation 
 
Figure 1 supports the statistical results. This figure presents four graphs, each showing 
average reliance on each revenue source five years before and five years after states implement 
property tax limits. States where data is not available for this full time-span are excluded (Maine, 
Wisconsin, Idaho, Oregon, Utah), as are states that never adopt limits. The vertical line in each 
figure represents the implementation of the limit. These figures show descriptively that property 
tax limits are associated with a decreased reliance on property taxes and increased reliance on 
charges and fees and to a lesser extent on income taxes. Again, there is no clear relationship with 
property tax limits and reliance on sales taxes. 
Interestingly, the affect of property tax limits appears to occur shortly before the official 
implementation of the limit. This may mean that lawmakers change revenue policy in anticipation 
of TEL implementation, perhaps at the time when the limit is adopted. Another possibility is 
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that the early changes in revenue policy are reflections of other events that are correlated with the 
adoption of property tax limits.  This possibility led Kousser, McCubbins, Moule 2008 to 
conclude that TELs, by themselves, are not responsible for the declines in total state own-source 
revenue. For example, state legislatures commonly adopt property tax cuts or change assessment 
practices in an attempt preempt the passage of limits at the ballot box. Regardless of the exact 
timing, it is clear that property tax limits are significantly associated with changes to revenue 
policy. In the next section, we more thoroughly explain the implication of this consequence 
during fiscal downturns, turning financial molehills into mountains.  
 
IV. Estimating Short–Run Revenue Stability  
We argue in this paper that shifts in revenue streams associated with property tax 
limitations have had deleterious affects on state financial health during recessions.  Our 
conclusion is drawn from a literature in public finance that tells us that many of the new revenue 
sources that states rely on to replace lost property tax revenue are income-elastic. Research in 
public finance shows that income-elastic revenues lead to larger revenue growth in the long-run 
but are less stable in the short-run during a fiscal crisis.  
The most comprehensive examination of short-term revenue instability during fiscal crises 
is by Holcombe and Sobel (1997). The authors present an error-correction model of tax elasticity. 
Elasticity refers to the responsiveness of revenues to changes in personal income. They find that 
corporate income taxes, personal income taxes, and non-food retail sales taxes are income-elastic 
whereas taxes on fuel usage and liquor sales are income-inelastic. Although they do not formally 
test the elasticity of property taxes (which is generally a local, not state revenue source), they 
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characterize this revenue as "relatively stable over the business cycle." (Holcombe and Sobel 
1997, p. 186). Looking at state-level data, Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) found that short-run 
income elasticity was greater for income taxes than for sales taxes. 
An omission in the literature is the absence of analysis on the elasticity of charges and 
fees. Charges and fees are now the largest single revenue source for state and local governments in 
many states (McCubbins and Moule 2009). In this paper we replicate the aforementioned results 
on the income-elasticity of tax revenue sources, and present new results on the elasticity of 
charges and fees and property taxes. 
 We rely on the method described by Holcombe and Sobel (1997) to estimate the short–run 
elasticity of state and local revenue sources. For this analysis we use data from the Department 
of Commerce on aggregate state and local revenue components from 1963–2005. This dataset 
includes a breakdown of state and local revenues into sales taxes, personal income taxes, 
corporate income taxes, property taxes, and other revenue sources, nationwide. This last category 
includes motor vehicle license taxes, other taxes, charges and fees, and miscellaneous revenues. All 
variables are transformed to constant dollars using the consumer price index.  
 Optimally, to estimate income elasticity it is best to have data on tax bases, not tax 
revenues. As explained by Holcombe and Sobel, elasticity estimates will be biased if policy 
decisions to raise or lower taxes are correlated with economic changes. Though this is a 
consideration in our analysis, Holcombe and Sobel’s own estimates show that there is a strong 
correlation between estimates derived from tax bases and tax revenues. Further, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the “tax base” from which charges and fees are drawn.  As 
such we follow previous analysis, including Box, Fox, and Tuttle (2006), and estimate the income 
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elasticity of actual revenues. 
 Holcombe and Sobel (1997) develop an error correction model to estimate short–run income 
elasticity described by (2): 
(2)      
! 
" ln(Rt ) = # + $1" ln(It ) + $2(% t&1) +'  
Where Rt is the time-series of a revenue component, It is the time-series of state personal income, 
and E t is a variable used for error-correction. As described by Holcombe and Sobel, error 
correction is necessary in the estimation of short-run elasticity because “Two non-stationary 
variables that have a long-run relationship with one another will tend to move back together 
whenever they get too far apart (a regression to their mean relationship). Thus one may observe 
one variable moving down in the same period another is moving up simply because the variables 
deviated from the levels implied by their long-run relationship” (Holcombe and Sobel 1997, p 
83).   Here, the error correction variable is the lagged residual derived from an estimate of long-run 
elasticity (see Sobel and Holcombe 1997).  
 Table 4 presents the short-run income-elasticity estimates of the major components of 
state and local revenue. These coefficients represent the percentage change in the revenue 
component associated with a one percent change in state personal income. The results largely 
confirm the analysis by Holcombe and Sobel. Corporate income tax revenue has the highest-
elasticity, varying by 2.83 percentage points for every one percent change in total state personal 
income. This result is graphed in Figure 2. Changes in corporate income tax revenues follow 
roughly, and magnify nearly three-fold, changes in personal income. The results for personal 
income taxes are very similar, with an income-elasticity of 2.17.  
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Table 4 
 An Error Corection Model of Short–Run Income Elasticity, 1963–2005 
Note:  Estimates from a regression of changes of logged personal income on changes 
of logged revenue sources. Error correction from long–run elasticity estimates are 
employed. Analysis uses Commerce Department data of state and local government 
revenues (constant dollars) and BEA annual estimates of national personal income 
(constant dollars) from 1963–2005. R–squareds range from 0.07 (property taxes) to 
0.59 (pesonal income taxes). * signifies that the coefficient is significant at the .1 
confidence level; ** at the .05 level; and *** at the .01 level. 
 Table 4 also shows that receipts from “other” sources, largely charges and fees, have 
elasticity greater than one. Again, this level of elasticity means that this revenue source will 
fluctuate more than the general economy. The income-elasticity of charges and fees is not 
surprising given what we know about consumer behavior during recessions. As the most recent 
Census data shows, recessions stop consumers from getting married, moving, immigrating, and a 
variety of other behaviors associated with government fees for services. Revenues from impact 
fees, charges paid by real-estate developers for development projects, certainly slow or can even 
cease during downturns. If citizens are not paying as much charges and fees during recessions, 
revenues will go down even when costs for the government are fixed. The elasticity of charges 
and fees is graphed against income in Figure 3.   Again, as supported by the regression data, this 
revenue source matches and magnifies changes in the economy. 
Corporate Income Tax 2.83 (0.52)***
Personal Income Tax 2.17 (0.31)***
Charges and Fees 1.06 (0.15)***
Sales Tax 0.93 (0.13)***
Property Tax 0.12 (0.16)
Regression Coefficients of Short-Run Income Elasticity
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Figure 2  
Income–Elasticity of Corporate Income Taxes 
 
Figure 3 
 Income–Elasticity of Charges and Miscelaneous Revenues 
 
We also confirmed through this analysis that property tax revenues are highly income-
inelastic.  Of the five revenue sources analyzed herein, property taxes are the only source of 
revenue that is not significantly predicted by changes in personal income. Figure 4 plots the 
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change in log state and local property tax revenue with the change in log personal income. As 
evident from the figure, property tax revenues often appear almost counter-cyclical. 
Figure 4 
Income–Inelasticity of Property Taxes 
 
The important lesson from this analysis is that some revenues will be more stable than 
others during times of fiscal crisis. Although the most recent fiscal crisis was precipitated by 
falling home prices, historically property values are stable during downturns. Moving away from 
property taxes to more elastic forms of revenue, such as the charges and fees or income tax, could 
make states more susceptible to cyclical volatility. This danger was recognized by Holcombe and 
Sobel who noted that, "If the trend away from local reliance on property taxes continues, 
however, local governments may not be as insulated from recessionary fiscal crisis in the future." 
(Holcombe and Sobel 1997, p. 51)  
 The consequence of increased elasticity after adoption of a property tax limit is particularly 
clear in the case of Oregon. Although Oregon officially had a binding property tax limit in place at 
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the beginning of our time series (it passed a levy-limit of 106% growth starting in 1916), Oregon 
passed additional limitations in 1990, 1996, and 1997 (the 1996 limit was never implemented). 
The change in revenue policy before and after 1990 has particularly noticeable implications for 
elasticity. Prior to 1990, Oregon had a levy-based system of calculating property taxes. Local 
governments passed a budget and deducted the amount of state aid from the total. The remaining 
revenue requirement would determine that year’s property tax rate. The anti-cyclical behavior of 
this system, as noted by Thompson and Greene (2004), is that the level of tax burden from year 
to year was highly dependent on state aid. As noted by Thompson and Greene (2004), 
“fluctuations in state school aid were not random; the state legislature tended to increase funding 
during economic upswings and cut it during recessions, thereby exacerbating the local property 
tax’s bite.” (Thompson and Greene 2004, p. 75). The adoption of the 1990 property tax limit 
eliminated the property tax as a revenue safety net during recessions. Oregon’s revenues have 
become far more income–elastic following the adoption of this limit (Thompson and Greene 
2004).  
 
V. Property tax limits and Recessions 
We turn now to our central analysis, the affect of property tax limits during recessions. In 
this section we test whether property tax limits aggravate revenue declines during fiscal 
downturns. We rely on indicators from Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) for statewide recessions. 
The Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) data is a significant improvement to previous research that 
simply relied on national-level recession data. As shown by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005), 
there is tremendous variation between states regarding business cycles. This finding is not 
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surprising given the diverse economies of the fifty states.  Using this data we are able to take 
advantage in the rich variation in state business cycles to produce more accurate estimates of their 
effects.  
We estimate the affect of property tax limits, recessions, and their interactions on state 
and local general, own-source revenue using differences-in-differences. As previously 
mentioned, this model holds constant trends common to states over time as well as unobserved, 
time-invariant state-level characteristics. We do, of course, sweep many of the requirements for 
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), such as unconfoundedness, under the 
rug, however. We estimate the following equation: 
(3)    
! 
"y jt = #0 + #1$it + #2%it + #3$*%it + +#4"& it + #5' it + ai +( t + uit  
 
Where: 
 
y = fiscal outcome 
Τ = indicator a tax limit 
ψ = indicator of a recession  
θ=  Population and Economic Covariates 
Y= Political Covariates 
κ =  Year fixed effects 
λ = State fixed effects 
 
 All continuous variables are log-transformed and first-differenced. This specification is 
common with econometric data, particularly in the study of short-term effects of fiscal crisis. 
First-differencing is particularly helpful in eliminating  autocorrelation. However, because the 
Breuch-Pagan Test for residual autocorelation was affirmative, we also employ a lag dependent 
variable, as suggested by Beck and Katz (2009). Removing serial correlation is  important to our 
analysis because, as noted by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2003), serial correlation often 
causes one to underestimate standard errors in differences-in-differences estimation leading to 
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mistaken rejection of the null hypothesis. Indeed, from a series of simulations, those authors 
found effects “significant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo 
interventions.” (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2003, 1).  
 The coefficients of our model are interpreted as effects on state and local general, own-
source revenue growth rates. Our results are presented in Table 5. We present two models of our 
results, the second excluding the continuous economic variables as they are highly correlated with 
the recession indicators. Here we report the results for the first model. We find that both elderly 
and school-age population variables are insignificant, but that that a one percentage point change 
in total population leads to a 2.1 percentage change in the growth of general, own-source 
revenues.  Unified Republican and Democratic control of state government has the expected, 
although only weakly-significant effects on revenue growth, increasing growth during unified 
Democratic control and decreasing growth during unified Republican control. The inclusion of 
economic variables in Model 2 has negligible effects on these findings.  
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Table 5 
The Effect of Recession and Tax Limits on Revenue 
Note:  Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses. 49 states, Alaska excluded. Years Covered: 1980–2000. * 
signifies that the coefficient is significant at the .1 confidence level; ** at the .05 level; and *** at the .01 level. 
 The most important independent variables in this model are the affects of tax limits, 
recessions, and their interaction of the two on revenue growth rates. The results suggest that 
property-tax limits, in absence of a recession, have no affect on general revenue growth. This 
finding replicates the findings in our previous research (Kousser, McCubbins, Moule 2008). 
However, new to this paper is the finding that property tax limits do in fact have significant 
affects on revenue during recessions.3  The interaction variable suggests that in the presence of a 
recession, a tax limit would decrease state and local own-source general revenue by an additional 
0.3 percent. This result is significant at the 5 percent level. This decline should be interpreted 
                                                
3 This result is also consistent with the possibility that Property tax limits themselves are binding only 
during recessions. This alternative hypothesis has some anecdotal evidence to support it, and is a reasonable 
possibility given the fact that many property tax limits are tied directly to an index of economic indicators, such as 
growth in personal income or the inflation rate (Poterba and Reuben 1996, National Council of State Legislatures 
2009). We do not reject the possibility that this is an additional mechanism by which property tax limits reduce 
revenues during recessions.  
 
Model 1 Model 2
Lag DV -0.146 (0.064)** -0.151 (0.064)**
-0.071 (0.207) -0.023 (0.204)
-0.411 (0.308) -0.404 (0.305)
2.119 (0.345)*** 1.971 (0.449)***
-0.036 (0.156)
0.149 (0.094)
Unified Democratic Control 0.006 (0.004)* 0.006 (0.004)*
Unified Republican Control -0.005 (0.003)* -0.005 (0.002)**
Recession X Limit -0.003 (0.002)** -0.003 (0.001)**
Property Tax Limit 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.004)
Fixed Effects included included
Year Effects included included
Recession -0.012 (0.004)*** -0.010 (0.004)**
Constant 0.0375 (0.010)*** 0.032 (0.010)***
Number of Obs. 1029 1029
R-Squared 0.396 0.401
A LNGeneral Revenue
A LNSchool-Age Population
A LNElderly Population
A LNTotal Population
A LNTotal Employment
A LNPersonal Income
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cumulatively with the overall affect of recessions, which adds an additional 1.2 percent decline in 
revenue. States that enact property tax limitations fare much worse than states without limits 
during recessions. Given likely heterogeneity of the effectiveness of property tax limits, these 
results are likely underestimate the effect of these limits.  
VI. Conclusion 
 We have demonstrated that property tax limits have negative effects on state and 
local revenues during fiscal crises.  Property limits cause states to rely on income-elastic revenue 
sources, such as the income tax or charges and fees. The consequence of this substitution is 
apparent when you look at how these revenues are differentially affected by the economy. For 
many years, property taxes were a highly inelastic form of revenue, a source of stability in the 
face of personal income declines.  Greater reliance on an income-elastic revenue source will result 
in greater revenue declines during economic downturns.  This was shown in the negative and 
significant interaction effect between the recession indicator and property tax limits.  
 Our results suggest that states, in response to tax limits, are builidng a revenue system 
that puts them on a budgetary roller-coaster with huge swings between the apex of the coaster's 
climb and the nadir of its fall. As it seems unlikely that politicians will choose to limit spending 
during the good times, and so far attempts to adopt strict Rainy Day Funds have been limitted.  
Scholars of the origin of California’s Proposition 13 have long-time identified the highly 
progressive, and thus income-elastic, state income taxes as an immediate cause of the property 
tax limit. The economic boom of the late 1970s prompted high taxes and large surpluses. 
Paradoxically, as this paper has shown, the passage of the property tax limit only aggravates the 
problem of elastic revenues. It is ironic that heavier reliance in income-elastic revenues will, in 
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the long-term, have the opposite affect of the tax reformer's intentions. In the long term, income-
elastic revenue sources grow at rates higher than the economy itself. This means that it is 
plausible that tax reforms have actually set the course for the higher growth of government.  
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